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1. Background 
Developing new products is said to be the lifeblood of companies. Due to changing 
consumer needs and increasing competition, companies that want to enhance their 
market position and grow must develop new products to improve their competitive 
posture or even survive. New product development often requires a lot of resources in 
terms of research and invested capital.  Unfortunately, the success rate of new products 
in the market is generally low.  For example, Stevens and Burley (2003) reported that 
the failure rate of new products is somewhere between 40% and 75%. Cooper (2001) 
mentioned that approximately 46% of all resources allocated to product development 
and commercialization by U.S. firms had been spent on products that were cancelled or 
failed to yield an adequate financial return. Given the high costs associated with new 
product development, it is imperative for firms to find ways to market their new products 
better to minimize the probability of failure. Numerous studies have been conducted to 
determine the causes of new product failure and success. A common finding is that a 
good product idea and quality cannot by themselves guarantee the success and many 
other factors such as sales promotions have to be considered (Montoya-Weiss & 
Calantone, 1994; Calantone et al., 1996). In this paper, we tackle the issue of price or 
sales promotions as a tool that can be used to increase sales for new products.   
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Sales promotions are defined as a set of activities and techniques, mostly short 
term, designed to attract attention to a particular product and to increase its sales 
(Kotler, 2000). Sales promotions have become a fundamental strategy typically 
employed as part of a marketing mix.  Consequently, they have become a significant 
part of promotional budgets over the years. For example, sales promotions have been 
estimated to represent 74% of the marketing budgets of US packaged goods 
manufacturers (Cox Direct, 1998).   
There is a large body of literature on sales promotions that includes contributions 
that dates back from the 1970s.  This body of literature is mainly composed of two 
broad streams of research. The first stream of research is concerned with developing 
and reviewing the theoretical perspectives that can help explain consumer responses to 
promotions. For instance, theoretical perspectives such as adaptation level theory (see 
Monroe, 1973, Lattin and Bucklin, 1989; Kalwani and Yim, 1992), assimilation contrast 
theory (see Blair and Landon, 1979; Berkowitz and Walton, 1980; Urbany et al., 1988; 
Bearden et al., 1984), attribution theory (see Mizerski et al., 1979; Neslin and 
Shoemaker, 1989), prospect theory (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Diamond and 
Sanyal, 1990) and transaction utility theory (see Thaler, 1985; Grewal and Monroe, 
1998; Lichtenstein et al., 1990) have been proposed to explain how promotions 
influence consumers’ preferences and behavior.  
The second stream of research is concerned with the empirical assessment of 
the effects of price promotion on sales (Guadagni & Little, 1983; Blattberg & Neslin, 
1990; Narasimhan et al., 1996; Manning & Sprott, 2007 etc.). A number of these papers 
have focused on studying the ways in which sales promotions affect sales such as 
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brand switching (Dodson et al., 1978; Gupta, 1988; Blattberg & Neslin, 1990), 
stockpiling and purchase acceleration (Wilson et al., 1979; Neslin et al., 1985; Bucklin 
and Gupta, 1992; Bucklin et al., 1998), bundling (Stremersch & Tellis, 2002;  Foubert & 
Gijsbrechts, 2007) and consumption or quantity increase (Folkes et al., 1993; Ailawadi 
& Neslin, 1998; Bell et al., 1999; Nijs et al., 2001). Some papers focused on the 
decomposition of the total effect of promotions. For example, Gupta (1988) found that 
more than 84% of the total sales increase is due to brand switching, 14% due to 
purchase acceleration and 2% is due to quantity increase. Bell et al. (1999) extended 
the work of Gupta (1988) by studying 13 product categories and found that sales 
increases due to brand switching, purchase acceleration, and quantity increase are 
about 75%, 11%, and 14%, respectively. 
Although there is a large number of studies that have evaluated the effect of 
brand promotions, store promotion, and coupons, very few studies have examined the 
effect of multi-unit price promotions which involve selling more than one product for one 
price (e.g., “buy 5 units for $5, you save $2” etc.) on sales1. Nowadays, multi-unit price 
promotions can be beneficial to marketers for two major reasons. First, for retailers and 
manufacturers, it might be preferable to guarantee sales today than probabilistic future 
sales. An increase in the quantity of units sold on any shopping trip generates more 
revenue and also provides the customer a lower likelihood of running out of stock and 
consequently a lower likelihood of purchasing a competing product (Wansink et al., 
1998). Second, due to increasing time constraints, many consumers are becoming 
1 However, some studies have been carried out to assess the pricing of different package sizes. For 
example, Soman et al. (2001) examined how price bundling affects the decision to consume. 
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increasingly concerned about optimizing shopping efficiency by purchasing multiple 
units of products to save several trips to the store.  
To our knowledge, compared to the multitude of studies done on single-unit price 
promotions (e.g., buy one unit for $1, save $0.20), only few empirical works have been 
carried out to study the effect of multi-unit price promotions (e.g. “buy 5 units for $5, you 
save $2) on sales.  Blattberg & Neslin (1990) found that the sales of seven brands were 
significantly higher using multi-unit price promotions than using single-unit price 
promotions. Across a grocery chain of 86 stores, Wansink et al. (1998) carried out a 
field experiment to study the effect of multi-unit price promotions on sales of thirteen 
products. They found that for nine products, multi-unit price promotions generated a 
32% increase in sales volume compared to single-unit price promotions. However, they 
mentioned that the increase is in part due to the confusion of some consumers who 
believed that they need to buy multiple units to benefit from the promotion. Manning & 
Sprott (2007) mitigated this problem by informing participants in a hypothetical 
experiment that the price discount per unit is the same in both multi-unit price 
promotions and single-unit price promotions (i.e., “$1 for each unit” vs. “8 units for $8”). 
They found that multi-unit price promotions led to higher sales volume despite informing 
subjects about the absence of a difference in the amount of price discounts between 
multi-unit price promotions and single-unit price promotions. They also found that 
increasing the quantity specified in multi-unit price promotions (i.e., “2 units for $2” vs. “8 
units for $8”) has a positive effect on sales volume. Manning & Sprott (2007) explained 
the positive effect of multi-unit price promotions with the so called “anchoring effect”. 
Specifically, multi-unit price promotions can stimulate consumers to think about the 
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possibilities of using and stocking a quantity of the product higher than they usually 
would use and stock. These thoughts can then lead, in many cases, to purchases of 
higher quantities.  
We attempt to contribute to the literature on multi-unit price promotions by 
examining the effect of the distribution of the amount of price discounts on sales value 
and change in retailers’ revenue. The main objective of multi-unit price promotions is to 
induce consumers to purchase more units of the product. This objective is 
accomplished by offering price discounts on purchases involving more than one unit 
(Blattberg & Neslin, 1990). Past studies have examined the effect of an increase in the 
amount specified in multi-unit price promotions on sales volume. The amount of 
discount examined in these studies is generally set equal in single and multi-unit price 
promotions but the form of presentation is different (e.g., for single-unit price discount 
“1unit for $1, Save $0.25/unit”; for multi-unit price promotions “4 units for $4, Save $1”). 
Since the amount of price discount per unit is the same, a rational consumer should be 
indifferent between the two types of promotion. However, retailers generally just 
mention the multi-unit price promotion, making the consumer think that s/he has to 
purchase all the units to benefit from the discount (Wansink et al. 1998).  Indeed, 
Manning & Sprott (2007) (study1) found that 35.6% of people were confused about this 
issue.  
In contrast to previous studies on multi-unit price promotions, we decided to keep 
the number of units constant but vary the distribution across units of the amount of price 
discount to identify the price-discount distribution that yields the highest increase in 
sales and retailers’ revenues. Specifically, we compared the effect of three types of 
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price-discount distribution: (1) the quantity of price discount is distributed equally among 
units (i.e. “single-unit price promotions”); (2) the quantity of price discount is 
concentrated on the last purchased unit (i.e. like in the price promotion “buy n units and 
pay only for (n-1) units”); and (3) the amount of price discount is increasing in the 
number of units (i.e. the price discount on the second purchased unit is higher than 
price discount on the first unit and so on). 
 
2. Hypothesis  
As mentioned above, offering buyers a discount equally distributed among 
various units has been found to positively affect retailers’ sales (Manning & Sprott, 
2007). The positive effect of single-unit price promotion is partly attributed to its 
advantage of offering buyers a discount on every acquired unit (i.e. buyers of any 
number of units can benefit from the single-unit price promotion). Therefore, we are 
expecting to see a positive effect of single-unit price promotion on consumers’ WTP and 
sales of food products. 
Hypothesis 1: offering buyers a discount equally distributed among units (i.e. single-
unit price promotion) can increase consumers’ WTP and sales of food products. 
The second type of price-discount distribution is currently used by retailers 
offering buyers to purchase N units of the same product and to just pay the price of N-1 
units (i.e. get the last unit for free). For example, the promotion technique of “buy-one-
get-one-free” has been found to persuade consumers to increase their purchases and 
benefit retailers by increasing their sales and speeding up the stock clearance (Sinha 
and Smith, 2000; Li et al., 2007). In our case, the “buy N units and pay the price of N-1 
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units” discount can motivate, especially, the buyers of, e.g., (n-1)/(n-2)/(n-3)  units to 
buy n units and get the last one for free2. As a result we expect that offering consumers 
the last acquired unit for free can increase their WTP as well as retailers’ sales. 
Hypothesis 2: offering buyers of N units to pay the price of N-1 units can increase 
consumers’ WTP and sales of food products. 
While multi-unit price promotions that use an increasing amount of price discount 
is not currently used in retail stores, this type of price promotion is consistent with 
consumer demand theory for any normal good. For instance, it is well known, 
theoretically and empirically, that consumer WTP for a normal good is decreasing in 
quantity (i.e., the price decreases when the quantity increases; hence, a consumer is 
willing to pay more for the nth unit than for the (n+1)th unit). Therefore, a retail price that 
does not increase with the quantity is likely to not do much to change real consumer 
preferences. To provide an incentive for consumers to purchase more units, we propose 
in this paper a multi-unit price promotion strategy that provides consumers an 
increasing price discount on each additional purchased unit. The price discount is 
lowest on the first unit and reaches the maximum on the last unit. Consequently, we 
expect that - buyers will be attracted by the increasing benefit they can get from 
purchasing additional units of the product. 
Hypothesis 3: offering buyers an increasing price discount on each additional 
purchased unit can increase consumers’ WTP and sales of food products. 
2 However, it is important to mention that the quantity of discount specified in the promotion can significantly influence 
the effect of the price discount. For example, the “buy 6 and pay for 5” discount allows a buyer of six units to save 
one sixth of the price he/she has to pay for the six units in the absence of promotion. Nonetheless, if the discount is 
“buy 2 and pay for 1”, a buyer of six units can save 50% of the price he/she has to pay for the six units (i.e. same as 
buy 6 and pay for 3). Although it would be interesting to assess the effect of varying the quantity of discount (e.g. 
“buy 6 pay for 5” vs. “buy 6 pay for 4” vs. “buy 6 pay for 3” etc.), this is beyond the scope of our study and 
consequently, we opted to only use the “buy 6 pay for 5” promotion where all the discount is applied to the last unit. 
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To assess the effect of the distribution of the amount of price discounts, we used a 
relatively new value elicitation method, the so called multi-unit auctions. In the next 
section, we describe how a multi-unit auction works. Specifically, we first explain why 
we used a non-hypothetical experiment rather than real market data (e.g., scanner 
data). We then discuss why the use of multi-unit auction is more appropriate in our 
study than single-unit auction. In the third section, we present our experimental design.  
We then discuss the results in the fourth section and then draw some concluding 
remarks in the last section of the paper. 
3. Multi-unit auction 
Among the three studies done on multi-unit price promotions, Blattberg & Neslin 
(1990) and Wansink et al. (1998) carried out field experiments using scanner data from 
stores to assess the effect of multi-unit price promotions on sales volume. Scanner data 
constitutes a very useful data source due to its prominent advantages.  They are 
characterized by a high number of observations and the accuracy of collected values 
(prices, sales etc.) that can lead users to obtain good estimations and reliable results.  
However, access to scanner data is not easy, not to mention the generally prohibitive 
cost of its acquisition.  In addition, scanner data sets may not always include information 
about customers’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics. They are also not 
useful when examining new products that are being developed or are not in the market 
yet.  Due to these disadvantages, a number of researchers have used hypothetical and 
non-hypothetical experiments rather than scanner data, to evaluate promotion effects.  
For example, in contrast to Blattberg & Neslin (1990) and Wansink et al. (1998), 
Manning & Sprott (2007) carried out hypothetical experiments to study the effect of 
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multi-unit price promotions. In hypothetical experiments, however, participants tend to 
overestimate their values since they have no incentive to behave truthfully (Lusk & 
Shogren, 2007).   
Due to the skepticism surrounding the validity of values obtained from 
hypothetical experiments, economists and marketing researchers have turned to 
experimental approaches that involve the exchange of real goods and real money 
(Hoffman et al., 1993; Fox et al., 2002; Dickinson & Bailey, 2002; Shaw et al., 2006; 
Kassardjian et al., 2005; Rousu et al., 2005; Alfnes, 2007; Akaichi et al., 2012 etc.). 
Among these experimental methods, perhaps none has been more popular than 
experimental auctions that provide people the incentive to submit bids equal to their 
value for the good.  In these auctions, the participant may incur real costs if he or she 
deviates from their true values (Lusk & Hudson, 2004). The use of experimental auction 
in marketing and agricultural economics, however, has mostly been limited to single-unit 
auctions (e.g. second price auction (Vickrey), random nth price auction, BDM auction 
(Becker et al. (1964) etc.). In single-unit auctions, participants are generally asked to 
report their willingness to pay (WTP) only for a single unit of the auctioned product. To 
assess the effect of multi-unit price promotions, however, consumers’ WTP for multiple 
units of the same product is required. Hence, our paper stands out by being the first that 
uses non-hypothetical multi-unit auctions to assess the effect of multi-unit price 
promotions on consumers’ willingness to pay and sales value for a food product. Unlike 
single-unit auctions, multi-unit auctions allow participants to bid on multiple units of the 
same product. Multi-unit auctions require that a participant who is declared a winner 
pays the clearing price and purchases the quantity s/he revealed to be willing to buy. 
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Therefore, in contrast to the methods used up to now to study the effect of multi-unit 
price promotions, multi-unit auctions allow us to assess the effect of multi-unit price 
promotions on sales volue and valuation of new food products that are being developed 
or are not in the market yet (or have not been in the market that long yet).  
In our experiment, we used an incentive compatible multi-unit auction mechanism, 
the so called multi-unit Vickrey auction. Multi-unit Vickrey auction is a generalization of 
the second price auction. Each participant is asked to bid on multiple units of the same 
product and the winner pays an amount corresponding to the sum of the bids (excluding 
his or her own bids) that are displaced by his or her successful bids (Krishna 2010). For 
a better understanding of the auction mechanism, consider three bidders and three 
identical units of the same product to be auctioned. Each bidder reports a bid of three 
values (i.e. one value for each unit). Let’s say that bidder 1’s bid is (14, 9, 3), bidder 2’s 
bid is (12, 7, 2) and bidder 3 bids (10, 5, 0). If we rank the nine values, we obtain (14, 
12, 10, 9, 7, 5, 3, 2, 0). The pricing rule dictates that the owner(s) of the three highest 
bids is (are) declared the winner(s).  In this particular example, the owners of the bids 
14, 12 and 10 (i.e. bidder 3, bidder 1 and bidder 2) are the winners.   
The price that each winner has to pay (i.e. clearing price) is determined as follows. 
First, the common set of rejected values (i.e. the values that do not make their owners 
winners of the auctioned product) is determined. In our example the common set of 
rejected values is {9, 7, 5, 3, 2, 0}. Second, for each winner an individual set of rejected 
values, consisting of the common set of rejected values without the winner’s own 
values, is determined. In our particular example, the individual set of rejected values for 
bidder 1, bidder 2 and bidder 3 are {7, 5, 2, 0}, {9, 5, 3, 0} and {9, 7, 3, 2}, respectively. 
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Third, if the winner wins one unit, he/she pays a price equal to the first highest value in 
his/her individual set of rejected values. If the winner wins two units, he/she pays a 
price equal to the sum of the first and the second highest value in his/her individual set 
of rejected values and so on. In our particular example, bidder 1, bidder 2 and bidder 3 
each pays a price equal to 7, 9 and 9, respectively.  
In multi-unit auction, a participant can win more than one unit. For example, 
suppose that bidder 3 provided a bid equal to (15, 13, 8) so the ranking of values is now 
(15, 14, 13, 12, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2). Hence, bidder 1 wins one unit, bidder 2 does not win any 
unit and bidder 3 wins two units. The individual set of rejected values for bidder 1 and 
bidder 3 are {12, 8, 7, 2} and {12, 9, 7, 3, 2}, respectively. So, bidder 1 pays 12 and 
bidder 3 pays 12 for the first unit and 9 for the second unit. Since the price that the 
winner has to pay is not based on the winner's bid but on the bids of the other 
participants, bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy in the multi-unit Vickrey auction 
(Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Kahn, 1998).  
In our study, we auctioned six units of a new product in two rounds. In the first 
round participants report their WTP for each auctioned unit. We then provided the 
participants the price-promotion information and then asked them to again reveal their 
WTP for each of the six units. From the participants’ WTP before and after price 
discount promotion, we determine the quantity that can be sold, the value of sales 
before and after promotion, and retailers’ revenue from offering the corresponding 
discount. Using statistical and econometrics tools, we then assess if the price 
discounts increase or decrease WTP, sales value and retailers’ revenue and determine 
which of the price discount strategies yields the highest positive effect. Detailed 
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information about the multi-unit experimental auction used in our study is presented in 
the experimental design section. 
4. Experimental design 
We conducted our experiment in Barcelona (Spain). Before going through the 
experimental design, it is important to describe the product we used in our experiment 
especially in terms of packaging and its novelty. Since the implementation of the multi-
unit experimental auction requires the number of auctioned units to be fixed beforehand, 
we used a six-pack product (i.e. a package of six identical units of organic milk) for at 
least two reasons. First, we surveyed 80 consumers of milk and we asked them about 
the quantity of milk they are used to purchasing every week. We found that 56% of the 
surveyed subjects mentioned to buy a pack of six units of milk (each unit is equivalent to 
one liter). We also asked participants in our experiment the same question. The results 
showed that 66% of the participants buy a pack of six units of milk every week. Second, 
“six-pack” is the packaging form popularly used in Spain for products such as soda, 
juice, water, beer, and milk, which are products that consumers are used to buying in 
multiple units in the same shopping trip.  While a “six-pack” consists of 6 identical units 
of the same product together in a bundle, consumers in retail stores are not forced to 
buy the entire bundle – that is they can purchase less than 6 units by just opening the 
package and take the number of units they want to buy. This handling flexibility makes 
the product available to all consumer types (regular and occasional buyers)3 and also 
3 Otherwise, only consumers who need to buy the entire bundle will be able to purchase the product and, 
as a result, sellers can incur losses by ignoring buyers of few units. 
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enables retailers and manufacturers to perform different types of multi-unit price 
promotions for the products.  
In our experiment we used a six-pack of organic milk. Each unit contains one liter 
of organic milk. Organic milk is a relatively new product in Spain. The novelty of the 
product and hence the absence of promotions make the use of scanner data to examine 
the effect of multi-unit price promotions infeasible. Finally, it is important to note that 
Spanish milk is Ultra Pasteurized (using UHT method) which extends its shelf life and 
allows the milk to be stored unrefrigerated because of the longer lasting sterilization 
effect. Hence, milk buyers have the flexibility to store the products. Since we are 
interested in studying the effect of price promotions on consumer behavior for new food 
products, the novelty of the product was the fundamental criterion we used in selecting 
the product(s) that will be used in the experiment. Milk, water, beer, soda, and juice are 
products that are typically offered in six-pack bundles in Barcelona’s retail stores. 
Among the many attributes that are generally used to differentiate new products from 
their conventional counterparts, the organic attribute is currently one of the most 
prominent that is being used by food producers.  Since milk is a unique six-pack product 
that can be sold in both conventional and organic forms, we chose organic milk as the 
new product to use in our experiment.  
 In our experiment, we recruited a random sample of consumers in Barcelona 
metropolitan area. 120 subjects were randomly drawn from a list of people who are 
consumers of milk and responsible for food shopping in their household. These subjects 
were then randomly assigned to four treatments. Sessions were conducted in groups of 
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10 subjects so each treatment consisted of three sessions.  In the first treatment4, 
subjects were offered a single-unit price promotion that consists of a discount of 0.20€ 
on each purchased unit. In the second treatment, participants were told that if they buy 
six units of organic milk, they will only pay for five units. The participants in the third 
treatment were offered a promotion consisting of an increasing price discount that starts 
from 0.06€ on the first unit to a maximum of 0.34€ discount on the sixth unit (i.e., 0.06€ 
on the first unit, 0.12€ on the second unit, 0.17€ on the third unit, 0.23€ on the fourth 
unit, 0.28€ on the fifth unit and 0.34€ on the sixth unit). For robustness check, we 
provided the subjects of the fourth treatment the three types of price promotion at the 
same time. Since our objective in this paper is to examine the effect of different 
distributions of price discount and not the amount of price discount, we kept the total 
amount of price discounts across the units in the three types of price promotions 
constant. The experiment was performed in a room equipped with computers. We used 
the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) to collect bids and to determine the winner and 
the clearing price.  
The experiment was performed in four steps. In step 1, each subject sat in a table 
separated from the rest to minimize any possible interactions and allow anonymous 
bidding. After taking a seat, each subject was provided an identification number, 15€ as 
a compensation for his/her participation and a questionnaire on various aspects related 
to organic products, in general, and organic milk, in particular. To avoid brand effects, 
4 In each treatment, participants received the information on price discounts in the second round of the 
auction. In all treatments, we also informed participants that the amount of the corresponding discount 
will be deducted from the price that the winner (s) has (have) to pay. We did not provide the participants 
any information on the characteristics of organic milk. 
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we covered all the milk items with white paper. We then asked participants to complete 
the questionnaire.  
In step 2, once the questionnaire was completed, the actual experiment began. 
One of the main determinants of success in experimental auctions is a good 
understanding by the participants of the functioning and the incentive compatibility of 
the auction mechanism. To achieve this goal, we gave each participant a printed 
material that included a detailed explanation of how the auction works and some 
examples to illustrate the auction. After reading and discussing the instructions, 
participants were given an oral explanation supported by some examples on the board. 
During the explanation, participants were totally free to ask questions to dissipate any 
doubts about the process. Given the importance of this step, we informed participants 
that it is very important that they fully understand the auction mechanism. We also 
demonstrated to them how they can lose money if they deviate from their true 
valuations. We moved to the next step only after being sure that all participants fully 
understood how the auction mechanism worked. Before conducting the actual auction, 
we also carried out a training session, auctioning six identical items of organic milk but 
informed participants that no actual economic exchange will take place at the end of the 
training session. In this session, we asked participants to bid the amount they are willing 
to pay for each unit of organic milk5. Once all participants reported their bids through the 
computer, the identification number of winner(s) and the price he/she (they) has (have) 
to pay (i.e. clearing price) was determined. Subjects were again encouraged to ask 
5 Similar to the real market, we informed participants that they are not forced to buy the six units of 
organic milk. For example, if someone wants to buy just two units, s/he should bid positive bids for the 
first and the second unit and zero for the rest of the units. 
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questions after the training session to make sure that they understand the auction 
mechanism and procedures. 
In step 3, once the participants became familiar with the procedure, we announced 
the start of the real auction of organic milk. We informed them that two rounds of 
auction will be performed and that one of these will be chosen as the binding round after 
the auctions. The winner(s) in the binding round will be appointed as the winner(s) of 
the auction. The products will be given to the winner(s) who will then have to pay the 
corresponding market-clearing price. In each round, the subjects had to submit, again 
through the computer, how much he or she was willing to pay for each of the six units of 
organic milk. Once all participants finished reporting their bids, the software determined 
whether the participant was the winner or not and the price that he/she had to pay for 
each unit won6.  
In step 4, we provided the participants information about the price promotion after 
the first round.  Those in treatment 1 were offered the single unit price promotion; those 
in treatment 2 were offered the “buy six and pay for five” promotion; and subjects in 
treatment 3 were offered the increasing price-discount promotion.  Subjects in treatment 
4 were simultaneously offered the three price promotions. We then asked participants to 
again report their willingness to pay for each of the six units of organic milk. Since 
participants in the fourth treatment were simultaneously offered three types of price 
promotion that were ordered randomly for each subject, they have to report three values 
for each unit (i.e. one under the single-unit price promotion, one under the “buy six and 
6 However, the clearing price was not revealed to participants to avoid any affiliation effect (Corrigan & 
Rousu, 2006) and for clean assessment of price promotion effect. 
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pay for five” promotion and another value taking into account the increasing price-
discount promotion).  
As explained to the subjects in step 3, at the end of the auction, one round was 
chosen randomly to determine the binding round. The winner(s) in the binding round 
was (were) appointed as the winner(s) of the auction. Once the results were 
announced, the experiment ended by handing the product to the winner(s) who had to 
pay the corresponding market-clearing price. If the binding round is the second one, the 
corresponding discount is applied and the winner pays a price decreased by the amount 
of the discount. For example, in the case of single unit price promotion, the price for 
each unit won is discounted by 0.20€. In the “buy 6 pay for 5” treatment, winner of six 
units pays the corresponding price for the first five units and gets the sixth one for free. 
In the increasing price-discount promotion treatment, the winner of three units, for 
example, pays for the first, the second and the third unit at a price discounted by 0.06€, 
0.12€ and 0.17€, respectively. As previously mentioned, in the fourth treatment we 
obtained values for each type of price promotion.  For each type of price promotion, the 
winner(s) and the clearing price are determined. If the second round is chosen as the 
binding round, the auctioneer chooses randomly one of the three types of price 
promotion as the binding price discount and the corresponding discount is applied to the 
price that winner(s) has (have) to pay.  
5. Results 
 Although there is theoretical and empirical evidence on the need for price 
discounts and promotions for products generally sold in multiple quantities (Blattberg & 
Neslin, 1990; Wansink et al., 1998; and Manning & Sprott, 2007), many retailers 
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continue to offer a majority of these types of products without any discounts (i.e. the 
price is independent of the quantity bought). Manning & Sprott (2007) went through the 
data of the top twenty grocery firms in terms of US market share and found that 27% of 
the products are promoted using multi-unit price promotions with price discount. They 
also reported that in addition to single unit-price promotions, the most common way to 
promote products sold in multiple units is to offer two units of the same product for a 
single price. Although these two price promotion approaches have been shown to have 
a significant effect on sales value, another approach is to use price promotions that 
might adjust better to consumer preferences. Both single unit-price promotions and 
multi-unit price promotions studied by Manning and Sprott (2007); Blattberg & Neslin 
(1990) and Wansink et al. (1998) offer the same price discount per unit. However, the 
decreasing shape of demand curve suggests that a consumer is more interested in 
buying the first unit than the last ones. Therefore, to increase his/her interest on the last 
units, it may be appropriate to apply more price discount on these last units than on the 
first ones. In this paper we examine the effect of three price promotion approaches that 
share the same total amount of price discount but differ in terms of the distribution of 
these discounts across units. 
We assessed the effect of price-discount distribution on participants’ WTP, sales 
value and retailers’ revenues. To examine the effect on participants’ WTP, we estimated 
a random effect Tobit model. The effect of the different types of price discount is 
assessed by including three dummy variables. Each dummy variable takes the value 1 if 
the corresponding price promotion is offered to participants; and 0 otherwise7. As in 
7 Since participants received price promotion only in the second round, all the dummy variables take 0 for 
all the observations corresponding to the first round. 
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previous studies, we also evaluate the effect of price-promotions on sales value. Unlike 
previous studies, however, we calculated the value of sales from participants’ WTP. We 
first estimated the average market price of organic milk and ended up with a price of 
1.16 € for a single unit8. If subject’s WTP for a unit is higher than 1.16€, we then 
considered it as a sold unit. Otherwise, the sales value is equal to zero. For example, 
suppose that a participant reported the following WTP: 1.90€ for the first unit, 1.63€ for 
the second unit, 1.20€ for the third unit and 0€ for the fourth, fifth and the sixth unit. 
Hence, considering the estimated market price, this participant can buy 3 units at 1.16€ 
each since his/her WTP for the first three units is higher than 1.16€. In this case the 
sales value is then equal to 3.48€ (i.e. 1.16€ x 3). To test the statistical significance of 
the effect of price-promotions on sales value, we used a paired t-test. 
A positive effect of price-discount promotion on participants’ WTP and sales 
value does not always imply that the effect benefits retailers. For example, a participant 
may increase his/her WTP by an amount at most equal to the quantity of price discount.  
As a result, sales value increases but the change in retailers’ revenue (i.e. the 
difference between the sales value before the promotion and the sales value after the 
promotion decreased equivalent to the amount of the price-discount) will be equal to 
zero or negative. Hence, retailers can benefit from a particular promotion if the sales 
value after the promotion surpasses the sales value before the promotion plus the 
promotion cost.  
8 There was an attempt by a supermarket of high quality foods in Barcelona to introduce its own brand of 
organic milk with a market price of 1.04€/unit. Also the manufacturer who provided the organic milk 
used in our experiment had the intention to sell his product at a price of 1.28€/unit. Since the auctioned 
units of organic milk used in our experiment were covered (therefore, consumer cannot determine if the 
product is a retailer or private brand), we estimated the market price as the average of the prices of the 
two mentioned brands (i.e. 1.16 = (1.04+1.28)/2). 
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To determine retailers’ revenue, we first calculated sales value before and after 
promotion using the 1.16€ as the estimated market price. We then subtracted the 
amount of the price discount from the sales value after promotion. Retailers’ revenue is 
determined by the difference between sales value after the promotion, decreased by the 
price-discount amount, and the sales value before the promotion. Retailers’ revenue is 
then calculated for each participant. For robustness check, we also calculated retailers’ 
revenue using the estimated market prices of 1.04€ and 1.28€.  To illustrate, here is an 
example of how retailers’ revenue is calculated in the treatment where participants 
received the single-unit price promotion. We have seen in the previous numeric 
example that if a participant reported 1.90€ for the first unit, 1.63€ for the second unit, 
1.20€ for the third unit and 0€ for the fourth, fifth and the sixth unit, he/she can buy 3 
units at 1.16€ each. The sales value from selling three units to this particular participant 
is 3.48€ (i.e. 1.16€ x 3). Suppose that this participant reported the following values after 
receiving the single-unit price promotion: 2.00€ for the first unit, 1.85€ for the second 
unit, 1.50€ for the third unit, 1.18€ for the fourth unit and 0€ for the fifth and the sixth 
unit. Therefore, he/she can buy 4 units at 0.96€ (i.e. 1.16€ - 0.20€) each and the sales 
value after promotion is 3.84€ (i.e. 0.96€ x 4). In this particular example, retailers’ 
revenue is 0.36€ (i.e. 0.36 = 3.84 - 3.48). After deriving the retailers’ revenue from each 
participant’s WTP, we then test the statistical significance of the revenue values using 
the paired t-test.  
Before examining the effect of the distribution of price discounts in multi-unit price 
promotions on WTP, sales value and retailers’ revenue, we use the data obtained from 
our multi-unit auction experiment to show the need to apply price discounts on products 
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generally sold in multiple units. Figure 1 exhibits the mean of participants’ WTP for each 
of the six auctioned units of organic milk. As expected, we found that subjects’ WTP is 
decreasing in the number of units ranging from 1.29€ for the first unit to 0.66€ for the 
sixth unit.  However, in real market, the price of the majority of food products sold in 
multiple units is independent of the quantity purchased (e.g. a buyer of three units of 
milk pays the same price for the first, the second and the third unit). Our finding shows 
that it is in the benefit of retailers and manufacturers to apply price discounts on 
products that consumers are used to buying in multiple units. As mentioned in the 
introduction, a large number of studies have shown that retailers and manufacturers can 
lose the opportunity to garner more sales if they fail to adjust their prices to consumer 
preferences by making them independent of the purchased quantity. 
After showing the importance of price discount as a possible tool for retailers and 
manufacturers to adjust their product prices to consumer preferences, we dedicate the 
following section to the assessment of the effect of different price promotions, which 
differ in terms of price discount distribution, first on participants’ WTP, second on sales 
value of the product and third on change in retailers’ revenue. In the three exercises, 
between-subjects (i.e., treatments 1, 2, 3) and within-subjects (i.e., treatment 4) 
analyses are performed9.  To examine the sensitivity of participants’ WTP to the price 
discount distributions and to take into account the panel nature of our data, we 
estimated a random effects Tobit model for each one of the six auctioned units.  
Formally, the random effect Tobit model is expressed as follows: 
 
9 In treatment 1, the price promotion is single-unit price promotion. In treatment 2, the price promotion is “buy 
six and pay five”. In treatment 3, the price promotion consists in an increasing price discount. 
Participants in treatment 4 received the three types of price promotion 
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where: j indexes the six units auctioned in the experiment (that is, this equation is 
estimated six separate times, once for each of the unit of organic milk under analysis); i 
indexes cross-section units such that i = 1, 2, . . . , N (N is the number of participants); 
and r indexes the number of rounds (time series units) such that r = 1, 2. The matrix Xirj 
is of dimension (2N x K) and contains data on the observable explanatory variables of 
the model for the six auctioned units j. Yirj is the amount consumer i is willing to pay for a 
unit j of organic milk. ( )',1 ,... jj kj j j k Rβ β β= ∈ are vectors of parameters to estimate. The 
effects of relevant unobservable variables and time-invariant factors are captured by the 
vector uij. The stochastic disturbances of the model for the six auctioned units are 
captured by the vector εirj.  
 The dependent variables are BIDj, where j = 1 to 6 indexes the WTP for the jth 
auctioned unit. Table 1 exhibits the independent variables we used in our models and 
the summary statistics.  Since inventory effects can be an important issue that could 
potentially influence WTP, we asked our subjects questions related to the number of 
units (similar unit we used in our experiment) of milk they normally buy every week 
(QUANTITY), frequency of buying organic foods (FREQ_OF), and size of their 
household (HOUSEHOLD).  These questions tend to provide less measurement errors 
than questions that directly ask people the amount of inventory they have at home 
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(Raphael, 1987; Coughlin, 1990; Koriat, 1993).  In addition to these variables, we also 
include a number of demographic factors as control variables in the models. 
Results reported in Table 2 show the effect (between-subjects) of the three 
approaches of price promotions on participants’ WTP. The model that deals with the 
effect of single-unit price promotion shows that offering subjects a 0.20€ off on each unit 
bought increases subjects’ WTP for all units.  Specifically, results indicate that this 
promotion type increases WTP by a range of 10.8 cents on the second unit to 20.9 
cents on the sixth unit, ceteris paribus.  As for the second model (treatment 2 model), 
results suggest that informing participants that buyers of six units will only pay the price 
of five units significantly increases the WTP only for the sixth unit by 15.9 cents at the 
0.10 level. Unlike the second model, results from the third model show that offering 
participants an increasing price discount in the number of units significantly increases 
the WTP for all six units of the product at the 0.01 level.  The increase in WTP ranges 
from 15.7 cents on the first to 21.6 cents on the second unit.  The average marginal 
effect across units of the increasing price discount promotion is about 18.6 cents 
compared to 14.9 cents for the single-unit price promotion. Therefore, the results 
generally indicate that the effect on WTP of the increasing price discount weakly 
surpasses the effect of single-unit price promotion.  In addition to the effect of price 
promotion, results in Table 2 show that participant’s socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics influence their WTP for organic milk. For instance, habitual buyers of 
organic food reported a higher WTP for organic milk. In addition, elderly and highly 
educated participants are willing to pay a lower price for organic milk than their 
counterparts. 
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To test the robustness of the results in the between-subjects analysis, we also 
conducted a within-subjects analysis using data from treatment 4 where the three types 
of price promotion strategies were simultaneously offered to the participants.  The WTP 
values from this treatment will reflect the relative utilities that each promotion type 
provides the subjects.  Table 3 exhibits results from the estimation of the random effect 
Tobit model10.  Interestingly, results indicate that single-unit price promotion increases 
WTP only for the last three units, ranging from 9 cents on the fourth unit to 13.5 cents 
on the fifth unit, ceteris paribus.  The “buy six and pay for five” strategy does not 
significantly increase WTP in any of the units.  In contrast, the increasing price discount 
strategy increases WTP of all units except the first one.  Marginal effects range from 
10.6 cents on the third unit to 14.8 cents on the fifth unit.  
Hence, our results generally suggest that the distribution of price discount in 
price promotions matters. We found that price promotion increases consumers’ WTP 
more when the distribution of the amount of price discount is increasing with the number 
of units than when it is uniform. However, when the amount of price discount is 
concentrated on the last unit as commonly practiced by some retailers, the response of 
consumers in terms of WTP is generally not statistically significant. 
As previously mentioned, there is a probability that participants increase their 
WTP by the amount of the offered discount.  To check whether participants used this 
strategic behavior, we compared the increase in participants’ WTP after being offered 
the discount to the amount of the actual offered discount for each purchased unit of 
10 This was possible, since participants in the fourth treatment and in the second round bid their WTP for 
each unit under the three price promotion scenarios: single-unit price promotion, buy six and pay five 
and increasing price discount. 
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organic milk. The t-test for independent samples was the statistical test used to test the 
significance of the differences between participants’ WTP and the amount of the actual 
discount. Tables 4 and 5 report the results from the between and the within-sample 
analysis, respectively. In the analysis, we considered only the participants who 
responded positively to the offered discount. The results showed that, in general, 
participants who received the “buy six and pay for five” discount or the increasing 
discount did not increase their WTP by the amount of the discount. However, 
participants who were offered the single-unit price promotion increased their WTP by an 
amount, generally, not significantly different from the offered discount (i.e. 0.20€). This 
might be explained by the fact that it is relatively easier for participants to identify the 
strategic behavior in the single-unit price promotion than in the other two forms of price 
promotion11.  
As in previous studies, we also evaluate the effect of price-promotions on sales 
value. Results on the effect of the three price promotion approaches are reported in 
Table 6. In the between-subjects analysis involving treatments 1, 2, and 3, we found 
that the single-unit price promotion and the increasing price-discount promotion 
increase sales value by 25% and 24%, respectively. The “buy six and pay for five” 
promotion only increases sales value by 3%.  Results from the within-subjects analysis, 
involving treatment 4, paint a little different picture.  While the single-unit price 
11 It is important to note that even in cases when participants behave strategically and increase their WTP by the 
amount of the discount; this would not necessarily result in zero retailers’ revenues.  For instance, let’s 
suppose that ith participant’s bids are as follows 1.80, 1.30, 1.00, 0.80, 0 and 0 for the first unit, the 
second unit, the third unit, the fourth unit, the fifth unit and the sixth unit, respectively. Suppose that the 
market price is 1.16. So, before offering the discount, retailer’s sales are equal to (1.16 X 2). Let’s 
suppose that after offering the discount (e.g.  0.20€ discount on each purchased unit) ith participant 
increased this/her bid for each unit by 0.20€ resulting in the following bids 2.00, 1.50, 1.20, 1.00, 0.20 
and 0.20 for the first unit, the second unit, the third unit, the fourth unit, the fifth unit and the sixth unit, 
respectively. Retailers’ sales are now equal to (1.16 X 3). As a result, the retailer’s revenue after the 
promotion is positive and equal to 0.56€ (i.e. (1.16 X 3) – (1.16 X 2) – (0.20 X 3)).  
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promotion and “buy six and pay for five” promotion generally increases sales value by 
20% and 15%, respectively, the increasing price-discount promotion augments sales 
value by 52%. Hence, the increasing price-discount promotion strategy seems to 
provide the most positive effect in terms of WTP and sales value while the “buy N, pay 
N-1” promotion strategy that is regularly utilized by retailers seems to provide the least 
positive effect. 
In our multi-unit experimental auction, we only auctioned a maximum of 6 units 
and, hence, participants were not allowed to buy more than 6 units. As a result, it is very 
unlikely that buyers of 6 units would be positively affected by price promotion, since they 
can’t increase their demand.  For a cleaner analysis, we divided our sample into two 
subsamples: (1) buyers of six units and (21% of the whole sample) (2) buyers of less 
than six units (79%f the whole sample). We then tested the effect of the three price 
promotion approaches on sales value in both subsamples, and again conducted the 
within and between-subjects analyses.  Table 7 exhibits the between-subjects analysis 
while Table 8 shows the within-subjects analysis of the effect of three types of 
promotion strategies on sales value.  We found that the effect of the increasing price-
discount promotion is significantly larger than the effect of the other two price 
promotions when considering only the buyers of less than 6 units.  Specifically, the 
increase in sales value was about 204% in the between-subjects analysis and 87% in 
the within-subjects analysis. We also found that the increase in sales value generated 
by single-unit price promotion is equal to 58%, compared to 6% by the “buy six and pay 
for five” promotion in the between-subjects analysis for buyers of less than 6 units. Also, 
in treatment 4 where all price promotion approaches were simultaneously presented, 
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the increase in sales value generated by the single-unit price promotion is higher than 
the increase provided by “buy six and pay for five” promotion (i.e. 39% vs. 31% ; see 
table 8).  As expected, the different types of price promotions did not generate positive 
effects on sales value for the buyers of six units since they were not allowed to buy 
more than six units.   
Our findings on the sensitiveness of WTP and sales value to price promotions 
clearly suggest that consumers respond positively to price discounts. We found that the 
sensitiveness of sales to price promotion depends on the distribution of the amount of 
price discount across the units. In fact, our results showed that the most effective 
discount distribution strategy among those we examined is to allow the amount of price 
discount to increase through the number of units. For robustness check, we also 
calculated change in retailers’ revenue using three levels of estimated market price 
1.04€, 1.16€ and 1.28€. The results displayed in Table 9 show that only the increasing 
price discount strategy generated positive benefits in both between and within 
treatments and for all the estimated market prices. For example, considering 1.16€ as 
the estimated market price to determine sales value, we found that the increasing price 
discount generated revenues of 0.10€ per person in the between subjects treatments 
and 0.42€ per person in the within subjects treatment. The results are mixed in the 
single-unit promotion and the “buy 6 pay for 5” promotion. For example, the single-unit 
promotion strategy yields positive revenue values in the between subjects treatments 
but negative revenue values in the within subject treatment.  Although, the effect of the 
increasing price discount on retailers’ revenue is economically significant, our result 
showed that this effect is statistically insignificant. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 Increasing time constraints are pushing consumers to optimize their shopping 
efficiency by acquiring more quantity of the same product. To take advantage of this 
change in consumer behavior, retailers and manufacturers are increasingly using multi-
unit price promotions that involve a price discount for multiple units of a product. 
Previous studies found that multi-unit price promotions generate significantly higher 
sales value relative to single-unit price promotions even if both price-promotion 
approaches offer an equivalent price discount per unit.  In this paper, we examined an 
issue of emerging interest to researchers, retailers and manufacturers - that is the 
distribution of price discount across units of a good. Specifically, we assessed the effect 
of three price-discount distributions (uniform price discount distribution, increasing price 
discount distribution and price discount concentrated on the last unit) on WTP, sales 
value and retailer’s revenue for a relatively new product.  We focused on examining this 
issue on a new product due to the historically and well documented low success rate of 
new product introductions and hence, the importance of finding appropriate marketing 
strategies that can increase likelihood of a successful product launch. In addition to 
contributing to a better understanding of consumer behavior toward multi-unit price 
promotion, we also show how multi-unit auctions can be used as a non-hypothetical 
experimental tool to study the effect of marketing strategies on consumer behavior for 
multiple units of a new food product.     
Our results generally suggest that increasing price discount with the number of 
units increases WTP, sales value, and revenue. We also found that uniform price 
discount promotion has the potential to motivate consumers to buy more units of the 
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same product but its effect on WTP, sales value, and change in revenues is generally 
lower than the increasing price discount strategy. The multi-unit price promotion (e.g. 
buy six and pay for five for six-pack products) that applies all the amount of price 
discount on the last unit provided only a weak effect on sales value.  These results can 
have significant implications for retailers.  Considering that the “buy N, pay N-1” strategy 
is often utilized by retailers (Laroche et al., 2003; Raghubir, 2004), our findings 
generally imply that these retailers would be better off to use an increasing price 
discount strategy in their multi-unit price promotions for new products. In this study, 
however, we only examined one type of increasing discount strategy. A good topic for 
future research is the assessment of the effect of different amounts of increasing 
discount across units on consumers’ WTP for a product. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Gupta (1988) and Bell et al. (1999) found that the increase in total sales is 
generally due to brand switching, purchase acceleration and quantity increase. This 
paper provided insights on how consumers’ WTP and sales are affected by the 
distribution of price discount across multiple units of a new food product. For a better 
generalization of the results reported in this paper, assessing the effect of price-discount 
distributions on brand switching and purchase acceleration could also be an interesting 
topic for future studies. 
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